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Abstract 
Firms are increasingly introducing new business 
models based on digital technologies in knowledge-
intensive, risky contexts that were long immune to them. 
In the financial industry, banks are opening themselves 
to robo advisory, an algorithm-based service 
supporting private clients’ investment decisions. Based 
on our access to a recent data set of 11,302 clients from 
a leading German robo advisory provider, we have the 
unique opportunity to analyze how clients react to 
algorithm-based services in contexts with high 
uncertainty and risk. Guided by theorical foundations of 
knowledge and routines, we find clients’ personal and 
business experiences with the focal bank to both, help 





Firms across various business contexts are offering 
additional services based on algorithms [1-3]. These 
algorithms transform existing business models, helping 
firms to offer existing services at lower cost. More 
recently, algorithm-based digital transformation has 
spread to new cost- and knowledge-intensive service 
areas in which clients face high personal risk [4-5], as in 
banking for private clients. Here, an important 
transformation of extant banking service is based on 
robo advisory, which provides clients with the option to 
rely on algorithms rather than bank advisors to actively 
manage their personal investment decisions.  
Large streams of research have looked into how 
individuals respond to digital technologies [6-11], and 
more recently algorithms [12]. While theses studies 
offer valuable insights of how users react to algorithms 
in making relatively “safe” decisions – i.e., those 
surrounding which either risk is low or technology is 
better understood – less is known about how clients 
respond to a service like robo advisory in a real-world 
setting. Other than an experiment, private shopping 
purchase, or work assignment gone wrong, unfortunate  
investment decisions put clients’ personal wealth at risk. 
Our study aims at providing deeper insights into what 
opens clients to use algorithm-based services in 
knowledge-intensive, risky contexts by investigating the 
case of robo advisory in banking.  
Before the introduction of robo advisory, the amount 
of professional investment advice that clients received 
could easily be distinguished according to their 
investment volume. Clients with a considerably low 
investment volume could either make decisions on their 
own or approach bank professionals to discuss 
investment alternatives. In contrast, clients with a 
considerably high investment volume had the additional 
option to receive bank advisors’ active portfolio advice 
(APA) on their investment decisions. Robo advisory is 
equivalent to APA with two notable differences: First, 
in the case of robo advisory, algorithms instead of 
humans actively support clients’ investment decisions. 
Second, as the costs of providing robo advisory are 
substantially lower than those of providing APA, clients 
can access the digitalized service at a much lower 
investment threshold. 
Tested and validated by the market, robo advisory 
enables broad strata of clients to receive active support 
on their investment decisions. Despite its many 
advantages, however, many clients can be expected to 
shy away from a digital format like robo advisory as it 
also leads to trepidations. First and foremost, clients 
have to overcome the well-documented algorithm 
aversion [13], i.e., their concerns about “trusting” the 
advice of algorithms. In addition, they have to break 
with established habits and routines [14-15]. Finally, 
clients need to be open to a new digital advisory format 
that requires them to take on greater responsibility. They 
need to face not only their own knowledge gaps, but also 
their inability to “scapegoat” misplaced investment 
decisions, as they rather than their bank advisors must 
feed and track the robo advisor [16].  
Building on a recent dataset of 11,302 private clients 
of an important robo advisory provider as well as 
insights from seven in-depth interviews with bank 
advisors, we analyze how clients’ characteristics relate 







to their robo advisory use. By using client data from the 
time frame before robo advisory was actively marketed 
by the focal bank under study – i.e., when bank advisors 
were prohibited from proactively approaching clients on 
the new service unless clients themselves reached out 
for information – we provide unique, real-world insights 
into the behavioral drivers behind clients’ robo advisory 
use. 
Guided by theoretical foundations of the behavioral 
decision-making [14-15]  and learning literature [17-19] 
we consider particularly how clients’ personal and 
business experiences at the focal bank – the basis of 
their robo advisory-aligned or -misaligned knowledge 
and routines – guide their usage decisions. First, we 
expect clients with longer history at the focal bank to be 
less open to use robo advisory. We assume that these 
clients have stronger routines in personal interaction 
with bank professionals that conflict with robo advisory 
use. In contrast, we assume clients having a high 
investment volume at their disposal to be more familiar 
with receiving advice. Therefore, we expect such 
wealthier clients to be more open towards using robo 
advisory than less wealthy clients. Third, we argue that 
clients who recently invested themselves – and with 
that, accessed first-hand investment information – are 
more open towards robo advisory based on having 
greater relevant knowledge.    
Our study contributes to extant literature in several 
ways. Besides information systems [13,] [20], there is a 
growing literature in management [21], [12], [5] and 
strategy (e.g. [22]) interested in the changes that 
algorithms and predictive analytics are inducing for 
firms, particularly in knowledge-intensive contexts. 
Complementing existing work considering e.g. how 
algorithms reshape firms’ internal sourcing or resource 
allocation decisions, we provide a client perspective on 
who uses robo advisory. Our findings resonate with the 
well-documented relevance of individual experience in 
shaping strategically relevant outcomes for firms [23-
25]. They suggest that clients opting for algorithm-
based services in contexts characterized by high 
uncertainty and risk base their decisions on knowledge 
and routines formed at their service providers. As such 
knowledge and routines may be more aligned or 
misaligned with a new algorithm-based service like 
robo advisory, they can both, help and and hinder its use.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
Individuals are generally biased against using digital 
technologies. Studies on online banking [26-29] show 
that clients are concerned about using digital technolo-
gies, even when they have considerably low personal 
risk. Users worry not only about the security and privacy 
[30], [27], [31] but also about the reliability [32] of such 
technologies. Lack of personal interaction may further 
enhance clients’ discomfort [33-34]. Discomfort is es-
pecially pronounced if these new technologies are based 
on algorithms [13], [35-36]. 
“Algorithm aversion”, i.e., individuals’ greater un-
easiness to trust algorithms [13], is a widely observed 
phenomenon even under conditions in which these algo-
rithms clearly outperform the decision-making of their 
human counterparts [35], [37]. Conditions in which al-
gorithms make superior decisions to humans can be 
found in contexts with weak and uncertain cues, i.e., 
lower predictability. Knowledge-intensive contexts like 
banking have long been recognized to have such condi-
tions [38]. A bank branch manager interviewed for our 
study describes how the unpredictability of the context 
has only increased over time: “Investment decision-
making has become so broad and affected by a flood of 
information, Mr. Trump twitters something and all the 
markets respond [immediately], it is nearly impossible 
to react so fast. Even as a bank advisor, you are active 
in many professional fields, you have things that you do 
at once, so that you cannot stay up to date on everything. 
Thank God that we have [back offices].” 
The introduction of robo advisory is only a recent 
phenomenon. Against this background, many clients 
can be expected to face strong trepidations in relying on 
algorithms. While individuals are generally known to 
have a strong tendency to avoid losses, despite high po-
tential gains [39], they can be expected to be even more 
concerned in entrusting a very novel and unfamiliar 
technology with investment decisions regarding their 
personal wealth. Our interviews with bank advisors in 
Appendix 1 highlight client concerns ranging from per-
formance of algorithms (Interview 3) to the vulnerabil-
ity of robo advisory to hacking (Interview 2).  
While many studies surrounding how users respond 
to digital technologies build on the Technology Ac-
ceptance Model, these studies focus on settings in which 
users face low personal risk, e.g. experiments, work as-
signments, or online shopping [6-11]. Additionally, 
such studies often regard less novel technology applica-
tions than robo advisory like online banking. Based on 
their lower levels of technical advance, such technolo-
gies often support clients by informing rather than exe-
cuting actions on their behalf. Not surprisingly, as their 
usage contexts and application areas raise fewer ques-
tions and concerns, users have been found to consider 
mainly their benefits and perceived ease of use when as-
sessing attractiveness. 
Usage considerations relating to very novel, risky 
technology-based services like robo advisory can be ex-
pected to be very different. Clients have long been long 
known to struggle with, or even delay, usage decisions 




their disposal [40]. With very low existing information 
to build upon, we expect those clients opting for robo 
advisory to base their decision on prior experiences 
formed at their service provider, in our case, the focal 
bank under study. While prior experiences – or better, 
the knowledge and routines resulting from them – may 
be more aligned or misaligned with robo advisory use, 
they represent the closest approximation that clients can 
leverage in assessing the attractiveness of such a novel, 
risky service.  
Figure 1 provides an overview of our model that 
links clients’ history with the focal bank (suggesting 
stronger routines misaligned with robo advisory use), 
their investment volume (proposing stronger routines 
aligned with robo advisory use), and recent first-hand 
investment information access (suggesting greater 
knowledge aligned with robo advisory use) to their like-
lihood of using algorithm-based portfolio advice.  
Figure 1. Conceptual model of clients’ likeli-
hood of robo advisory use 
We form the following hypotheses.  
 
Client History and Robo Advisory Use 
 
In knowledge-intensive, risky contexts such as bank-
ing, clients interact very closely and regularly with pro-
fessionals such as bank advisors. One main reasons is 
that professionals in such contexts possess very high do-
main-specific knowledge and skills, surpassing not only 
that of most clients, but even their own managers [41]. 
While personal interactions are generally high in bank-
ing, some clients can be expected to have accumulated 
more dealings than others. 
Particularly clients with longer client history can be 
expected to have accumulated great numbers of personal 
interactions with bank professionals, based on their 
longer time at the bank. Research on behavioral deci-
sion-making has long highlighted the central role that 
habits and routines play in shaping individuals’ actions 
and decisions [14-15]. While individuals generally dis-
like breaking with the comfort that habits and routines 
offer, they do so even more when they are reinforced 
over time. Accordingly, we expect routines in personal 
interaction to be particularly strong amongst clients with 
more client years. 
Not only habits and routines, but also trust is known 
to intensify with interaction history [3], [43-46]. Our in-
terviews with bank advisors in Appendix 2 illustrate 
how clients share more personal information and feel-
ings with them, the longer their stay at the bank (Inter-
view 3, Statement 1). Over the course of their client his-
tory, clients develop trust relationships with their advi-
sors (Interview 3, Statement 1). Such trust relationships 
tend to increase clients’ satisfaction with existing ser-
vice. Clients’ decision to stay at the bank, despite low 
switching costs to alternative service providers, is one 
reflection of the value that these relationships have (In-
terview 4, Statement 1).   
Clients are known to resist innovations which re-
quire a change in their existing habits and routines [47-
48] or a current situation with which they are satisfied 
[49-51]. Arguing that client history is the source of both, 
we expect clients with a longer history at the focal bank 
to be less likely to use robo advisory than those with a 
shorter stay. We assume that former clients will be more 
inert to switch from their trusted and appreciated per-
sonal relationships to receiving investment advice from 
algorithms. In summary, we expect routines in personal 
interaction to be misaligned with robo advisory use. We 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: The longer clients’ history with the fo-
cal bank, the lower their likelihood to use robo advisory. 
 
Investment Volume and Robo Advisory Use 
 
Scholars have observed clients to respond differ-
ently to innovations based on their financial situation 
[47], [52-53]. In line with that, we expect clients having 
higher investment volumes to show different reactions 
to robo advisory than those with lower ones. One main 
reason is that we expect clients with different wealth 
levels to have very dissimilar routines regarding the use 
of investment services. These services – particularly 
those offering higher support on investment decisions 
like APA – require clients to meet certain investment 
thresholds. For example, clients need to invest a mini-
mum volume of € 250,000 to access APA at the focal 
bank under study. Such high investment thresholds are 
the reason why portfolio advice was long restricted to 
the wealthy elite before the introduction of robo advi-
sory [54].  
As less wealthy individuals were long excluded from 
accessing supportive services based on low investment 
volume, they could not form habits and routines in re-
ceiving high investment advice from financial advisors 
comparable to their wealthier counterparts. Also, their 
exposure to information on personal services compara-
ble or equivalent to robo advisory, such as APA, was 
lower. In summary, while all clients can be expected to 




their investment decisions, wealthier clients can be as-
sumed to be more acquainted with and/or be better in-
formed about receiving higher levels of (personal) in-
vestment support than less wealthy ones. Less wealthy 
clients, on the other hand, need to familiarize with both, 
algorithms as well as receiving extensive support on in-
vestment decisions. Having less transferable experi-
ence, we assume robo advisory to appear more novel 
and unfamiliar to them. 
Individuals are known to be biased against options 
they perceive as less familiar when making decisions 
[55-57]. Considering this and the previously introduced 
theoretical foundation of sticking to habits and routines 
[14-15], we assume clients with higher investment vol-
ume to be more open to use robo advisory. Thus, we hy-
pothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: Clients with higher investment vol-
ume are more likely to use robo advisory than clients 
with lower investment volume.  
 
Recent Investment Information Access and 
Robo Advisory Use 
 
In the case of robo advisory, relying on the support 
of a digital rather than a personal portfolio advice goes 
hand-in-hand with clients needing to feed, track, and 
correct investment decisions of algorithms. To do so, 
clients need certain knowledge and skills on investment 
decision-making. Based on clients’ novel access to al-
gorithm-based services, but also the long-known vola-
tility characterizing knowledge-intensive contexts [38], 
we consider clients’ recent access to first-hand invest-
ment information to be particularly useful in this regard. 
First-hand information – i.e., information that indi-
viduals gain directly through own experience rather than 
through the experience of others – is a widely recog-
nized enhancer of individual knowledge [19], [58]. In 
banking, clients gain such knowledge by taking care of 
their investments themselves rather than relying on the 
knowledge of their bank advisors. While bank advisors’ 
knowledge on investment decision-making may often 
surpass that of their clients [41], clients, not bank advi-
sors, bear the responsibility of feeding and monitoring 
their robo advisor. By investing on their own prior to 
using robo advisory, clients learn to set up their own 
trading accounts, invest their own money along their 
risk preferences and follow the development of their in-
vestments over the internet. Such first-hand information 
automatically increases clients’ ability to use robo advi-
sory. Additionally, clients may become confronted with 
their own, human limitations in investment decision-
making [35], [37] and with that, recognize the oppor-
tunity that decision support by algorithms entails.  
Accordingly, we expect clients with recent access to 
such first-hand investment information to be more open 
to using robo advisory. We argue that the depicted first-
hand investment information is the basis for building 
relevant knowledge and skills for using robo advisory. 
Thus, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: Clients with first-hand investment in-
formation access are more likely to use robo advisory 
than clients without first-hand access. 
 
3. Data and Method 
 
We test our hypotheses using a data set of 11,302 
private clients provided by a leading German bank. 
Based on its economic, technological, and financial 
leadership, the German context is comparable to other 
major economies, including much larger markets like 
the United States. Both countries are among the world’s 
top ten economies, with the United States ranking 85.6 
and Germany ranking 82.8 on the global competitive in-
dex, which ranges from 0 to 100 [59]. Regarding the 
market for private investment services, Germany is 
dominated by only few banks [54], one of which is the 
bank under study. While robo advisory is a young but 
developing field in Germany, the quality of the respec-
tive models on the market for private clients can be con-
sidered as very high. As consumer protection is a key 
societal concern, only excellent robo advisory services 
are released on the market. Not surprisingly, rigorous 
testing and performance monitoring pre and post market 
introduction accompany all robo advisory launches. The 
quality of the robo advisory model under study has been 
tested by the most important consumer protection 
agency in Germany, scoring amongst the top three over-
all ratings [60]. 
The model became available to private clients of the 
focal bank in early 2018 and its characteristics are sim-
ilar to other robo advisory models in the market. To ac-
count for potential time lags in the decision-making of 
clients, we matched data on client characteristics from 
late 2017 with clients’ investment choices (i.e., using 
robo advisory or not) in 2018. Using data from the early 
time of robo advisory introduction has two advantages 
for our analyses. First, it excludes that our results cap-
ture implications of organizational restructuring rather 
than client behaviors. Afterall, the number of investment 
services and/or bank advisors is not adapted to the intro-
duction of a new service at such an early stage. Second, 
the time frame of our analysis rules out that bank advi-
sors rather than clients are steering their use of robo ad-
visory. In 2017, bank advisors were not allowed to pro-
actively approach clients about robo advisory in advi-
sory sessions.  
Our random sample covers both the entire spectrum 




at the bank under study. Amongst all investment ser-
vices provided, robo advisory is the only digital format 
that clients can choose. We include only clients that 
have the choice to use robo advisory in our sample. Spe-
cifically, as the investment threshold for qualifying for 
robo advisory at the focal bank is € 5,000, we consider 
only clients with an investment volume equal or above 
this threshold in our analyses. Also, in consultation with 
industry experts, we include only first-time APA users 
in our sample, to exclude the possibility that systematic 
differences in characteristics of first-time and repeated 
users of active investment support impact our results. 
Put differently, all clients in our sample are not only us-
ing robo advisory, but also its personal equivalent APA 
for the first time in 2018. To complement our theory 
building and understanding of empirical findings with 
insights from our institutional setting, we conducted 
seven in-depth expert interviews with bank advisors. 
We chose advisors based on their years of work experi-
ence with private clients, both at the focal bank and/or 
in other banks, and their familiarity with robo advisory 
(Appendix 3). The telephone interviews lasted on aver-
age 40 minutes and were conducted in late August 2018.  
Our empirical analyses include the following 
measures. Our dependent variable Robo Advisory is a 
dummy variable taking on the value of one if a client 
uses robo advisory and zero if s/he uses alternative in-
vestment services. Our two independent variables 
concerning routines are operationalized as follows. Cli-
ent History (Years) is a variable indicating the number 
of years an individual has been a client at the focal bank. 
A client history of 0 indicates that the client joined the 
bank in 2017. Investment Volume (in 10,000 Euros) in-
dicates the total amount of liquid assets that the client 
has available for investment decisions both, in savings 
accounts and investment deposits at the focal bank. In-
vestment volume data is winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
level in all analyses. While we choose a linear specifi-
cation of this key variable in our main analyses to pro-
vide readers with a straight-forward interpretation of its 
effect, our robustness tests covered and confirmed also 
its logarithmic specification. Our independent variable 
reflecting knowledge, Intensity of First-Hand Invest-
ment Information Access (Six Month Periods), is a vari-
able indicating the number of six month periods before 
January 2018 in which the client accessed investment 
information through own investment activity in the pre-
vious year. We include socio-demographic control var-
iables in our empirical analyses. Female is a dummy 
variable taking on the value of one if the client is female 
and zero if he is male. The client’s age is measured in 
years. Age data is winsorized at the 1% and 99% level 
in all analyses. Ln(Income+1) is the natural logarithm of 
the client’s income plus one. We proxy for clients’ dig-
ital affinity by their previous online banking activation. 
The latter is a dummy variable taking on the value of 
one if the client has activated online banking at the focal 
bank and zero if not. Lastly, we account for differences 
in clients’ advisor information access by a dummy 
variable measuring whether or not they used high 
investment decision support services in the previous 
year. In doing so we consider that certain clients may 
have had a higher opportunity to proactively seek 
information on robo advisory through advisors based on 
their service structure.   
Regarding our method, we follow existing literature 
[61], in employing a linear probability model (LPM) to 
estimate the impact of our chosen client characteristics 
on clients’ likelihood of using robo advisory. We also 
estimate other functional forms with non-linear re-
sponse probabilities. All results are depicted in Table 2. 
Whereas the R-Squared in the LPM represents the ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) R-Squared, the Pseudo R-
squared in our probit and logit models is based on log-
likelihood measures. As the marginal effects revealed 
by the probit and logit specifications compare to their 
LPM counterparts, we interpret only LPM coefficients. 
We further interpret odds ratios of our logistic regres-
sion effects to provide insights into the economic 




Our descriptive analyses point to large differences in 
who uses robo advisory. Table 1 shows the descriptive 
statistics and correlations for our full sample. Both, 
clients’ investment volume (r=0.118, p=0.000) and their 
intensity of first-hand information access (r=0.450, 
p=0.000) are significantly positively correlated with 
robo advisory use, while their client history is 
significantly negatively correlated (r=-0.070, p=0.000). 
Table 2 presents the results of our full sample regression 
analyses. Models 1 to 3 show the impact of the control 
variables on the likelihood of using robo advisory. 
Models 4 to 6 depict the results of the control variables 
and the independent variable Client History (Years). 
The following Models 7 to 9 show the results of the 
control variables and the second independent variable 
Investment Volume (in 10,000 Euros). Thereafter, 
Models 10 to 12 present the results of the control 
variables and the third independent variable First-Hand 
Investment Information Access (Six Month Periods). 
Finally, models 13 to 15 show the results of the full 
model. For an economic interpretation, we report effect 





Table 1. Regressions on likelihood to use robo advisory for all clients, DV=Robo Advisory 
 





Odds ratios indicate how a change in our independ-
ent variables – i.e., Client History (Years), Investment 
Volume (in 10,000 Euros), and First-Hand Investment 
Information Access (Six Month Periods) – alters the 
odds for the occurrence of the event of using robo advi-
sory. For robustness, the last column in Table 2 depicts 
the beta-coefficients of our main model 13, based on the 
(z-)standardization of all regression variables. As beta-
coefficients are unitless – i.e., they refer to how many 
standard deviations the dependent variable changes per 
unit standard deviation increase in our independent and 
control variables – they ensure that differences between 
our reported effect sizes are not driven by differences in 
measurement scales of our predictors.  
While we find support for our hypotheses in all 
models and model specifications, our results indicate 
particularly strong support for hypothesis 3. Results of 
our main model (Model 13) suggest that an additional 
six month period of recent, first-hand investment 
information increases clients’ probability of using robo 
advisory by 0.20 (p=0.000). The odds ratio of Intensity 
of First-Hand Investment Information Access ((Six 
Month Periods) is 3.837 (p=0.000), indicating that an 
additional six month period of recent investment 
information access increases a client’s odds to use robo 
advisory by over 300 percent. Our results for Client His-
tory (Years) suggest that each additional year of client 
history reduces the probability and odds to use robo ad-
visory significantly, but only marginally. Specifically, 
clients’ probability of using robo advisory decreases by 
0.001 (p=0.000), while their odds of using robo advisory 
fall by two percent (p=0.001) with each year at the focal 
bank. Lastly, our results for Investment Volume (in 
10,000 Euros) indicate similar, yet opposite effects in 
comparison to our previous predictor variable. They 
suggest that with each additional 10,000 Euros of invest-
ment volume, clients’ probability of using robo advisory 
increases by 0.01 (p=0.01). The odds ratio of 1.007 
(p=0.000) indicates that clients’ odds of using robo ad-
visory raise by one percent with every 10,000 Euros that 
they invest at the bank. 
We ran various robustness tests to build confidence 
in our findings ranging from regressions with log-trans-
formed investment volume measures to ones allowing 
for differences in effects between APA-qualified and  
-unqualified users. All robustness tests supported our re-
sults, highlighting particularly the centrality of first-
hand investment information, gained through own in-
vestment experience, in opening clients towards robo 
advisory – as do the beta coefficients in Table 2. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The objective of our paper was to investigate how 
clients respond to the recent introduction of a new ser-
vice providing algorithm-based investment advice – 
robo advisory in banking. Drawing on insights from a 
rich, large-scale data set of bank clients and interviews 
with bank advisors, we explored what drives the deci-
sion to rely on digital services in a knowledge-intensive, 
risky context. We find support for our hypotheses that 
clients’ history with the focal bank, investment volume, 
and intensity of first-hand investment information ac-
cess influence the likelihood of using robo advisory. 
While all three factors are significant, we find that cli-
ents’ intensity of first-hand investment information ac-
cess has by far the strongest impact on their use of robo 
advisory. 
Theoretical insights and empirical results of our 
study primarily speak to the behavioral literature in man-
agement [62-63], information systems [13], [20], psy-
chology [64-67], and finance [68]. We present both, 
main challenges that algorithm-based digital services in 
knowledge-intensive, risky settings face on the client 
side and ways to overcome them. In settings in which 
clients have especially strong reservations about using 
algorithm-based services despite the high advantages 
and new opportunities they offer understanding how us-
ers can overcome their trepidations and use services like 
robo advisory is of crucial interest to many parties. One 
main group are scholars interested in how individuals 
can improve boundedly rational decision-making [69], 
particularly in the context of new technology use [13], 
[20]. Our analysis of a large, real-world data set allows 
us to provide insights on the behavioral drivers of cli-
ents’ use of algorithm-based services that complement 
those documented by studies in less risky decision con-
texts, e.g. experiments. We find that in contexts charac-
terized by high uncertainty and risk, users’ experiences 
with their service providers – the foundation for 
knowledge and routines aligned and misaligned with 
technology use – are central in driving their adoption de-
cisions. Our results suggest that while existing routines 
may make clients slightly more or less open towards 
robo advisory, gaining first-hand information aligned 
with using algorithm-based services is a game changer 
when it comes to raising openness of clients.  
There are several limitations to this study, which pro-
vide room for future research. First and foremost, our 
study on the behavioral drivers behind clients’ robo ad-
visory use necessarily relies on cross-sectional data re-
ferring to the time before its introduction. While this fo-
cus allows us to rule out the impacts of organizational 
restructuring or marketing campaigns on our results, it 
raises other concerns. First, our data is subject to poten-
tial unobserved heterogeneity biases, which prevent us 
from inferring causal relationships from our analyses. 
Also, it constrains us in exploring additional, promising 
research questions – such as interaction effects between 
client characteristics – as it limits the number of obser-
vations available for respective subgroup analysis. Our 
analyses and interviews provide some comfort on these 
concerns. While individual characteristics of users may 
never be fully independent from one another, correlation 
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coefficients between observable characteristics in Table 
1 take on common magnitudes. Also, our detailed inter-
views with various industry experts working in the rele-
vant institutional field support our results. We welcome 
and encourage future research to replicate and extend 
our findings in different knowledge contexts, using lon-
gitudinal data. A second main limitation of our study is 
that we can only provide insights into clients’ extensive, 
not intensive, use of investment services. Based on the 
very recent introduction of robo advisory in the bank un-
der study, the largely personal format of investment ser-
vices, as well as German data protection laws, it is very 
difficult – if not impossible – to gather representative 
data on how frequently clients use investment services. 
Our study yields important practical implications by 
revealing which clients find robo advisory attractive. 
Primarily, our results can help bank advisors improve 
their recommendations to clients. In their daily business, 
many bank advisors still rely on largely theoretical con-
cepts on how clients respond to digital technologies to 
guide their service and recommendations. While such a 
bottom-up approach may be very valuable in general, it 
is subject to limitations when used to understand reac-
tions to new digital formats like robo advisory. By infer-
ring who uses robo advisory through analyzing a large 
data set, we offer real world insights into this question. 
Our study introduces a new business case on robo advi-
sory that can inform and inspire other firms, in particular 
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Appendix 1. Client concerns about robo advisory: selected quotes from bank advisors 
Interviewee #          Statement 
 
Appendix 2. Trust relationships, routines, and robo advisory: selected quotes from bank advisors  
Interviewee #          Statement 
 
Appendix 3. Overview of key interview and interviewee facts 
 
2 “There are two important questions. One question is, the robo advisory model, that sells and buys, that acts it-
self – of course, that requires trust – can it be hacked? Do you trust the algorithm? Do you feel comfortable let-
ting the algorithm invest for you? It’s like autonomous driving. I mean, do I want a car with a good navigation 
system that gives me tips, shows me where traffic jams are, but I am allowed to steer, or is the car driving? If it 
is really the case that decisions are executed by the algorithm, then trust needs to be there, in the data that the 
algorithm is fed with and how safe the algorithm is, an understanding of what can happen. That of course is a 
topic of concern for clients, if they decide to trust an algorithm.”  
3 “From a client perspective, the client for sure thinks that a person – an active portfolio advisor – is superior in 
making the one or the other investment decision. From a logical perspective it is the robo advisor that does bet-
ter.” 
Trust relationships between clients and bank advisors 
1 “[I have been advising some clients since 1999]. These clients, this may sound weird, they trust me blindly. If I 
tell clients to do something, they do it. They consider me part of the family. They know that we have been 
working together successfully for many years. Of course, investment performance also matters and there are 
better and worse years. But it’s the cumulative investment performance over many years that counts. It’s alright 
if there are a few bad years. It’s like in a marriage – as they say, it’s for better and for worse. [Also, in advisory 
relationships] you go through thick and thin together. But ultimately, that long connection, that personal [rela-
tionship you build], that is irreplaceable.” 
3 “Long client relationships mean that the client comes to you with all his/her financial issues – from investing 
money to credits, pension schemes, insurances, you name it. That the client trusts and knows that his/her con-
tact person will share all of his/her professional expertise with him/her.” 
Routines in personal interaction and robo advisory use  
3 “I personally doubt that a client who regularly interacts with bank advisors, talks with them will be up for the 
digital world with low interaction, where in the background computer-based decision processes are active. Cli-
ents have less influence there. When clients have close connection to [a contact person], they really appreciate 
that.” 
6 “Those clients who have a close connection with us, who enjoy our services, [they will stick to us]. It would be 
bad if it were different, I would say the goal of our bank is to create close connections to clients, a good cooper-
ation in which both sides work together.” 
4 “[Why clients with longer history would be less likely to use robo advisory?] Well, because they are satisfied 
with us.” 
7 “If a client is used to always having a contact person, for example me, if s/he calls me, I help him/her, I can do 
everything for him/her. […] S/he can always contact me. Then s/he has two contact persons. For a client, that is 
used to having a contact person, also specifically in APA, I think it is difficult for that client to receive support 
from a robot.”  
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